

Audit

Report



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UNIT CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
DEFENSE READINESS TRAINING

Report No. 98-174

July 17, 1998

Office of the Inspector General
Department of Defense

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Acronyms

CB	Chemical and Biological
CBR	Chemical, Biological, and Radiological
GAO	General Accounting Office
MOPP	Mission-Oriented Protective Posture
MOT	Mission-Oriented Task



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July 17, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (FINANCIAL
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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
(FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER)
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DEFENSE FOR COUNTERPROLIFERATION AND
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Audit Report on Unit Chemical and Biological Defense Readiness Training
(Report No. 98-174)

We are providing this report for review and comment. We conducted the audit at the request of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation and Chemical/Biological Defense. This is the second in a series of reports on the results of the audit. We considered management comments on a draft of this report in preparing the final version.

DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that all unresolved issues be resolved promptly. As a result of management comments, we deleted draft Recommendation 1. to the Joint Staff. The Air Force comments were partially responsive. We request that the Air Force provide additional comments on Recommendation 1.a. by August 31, 1998. The Joint Staff, Army, Navy and Marine Corps comments were responsive and no additional comments are required from those entities.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the audit staff. Questions on the audit should be directed to Mr. Harlan M. Geyer, at (703) 604-9593 (DSN 664-9593) or at e-mail address hgeyer@dodig.osd.mil, or Ms. Geraldine M. Edwards, at (703) 604-9489 (DSN 664-9489) or at e-mail address gedwards@dodig.osd.mil. See Appendix D for the report distribution. The audit team members are listed inside the back cover.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Robert J. Lieberman", is positioned above the printed name.

Robert J. Lieberman
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for Auditing

Office of the Inspector General, DoD

Report No. 98-174
(Project No. 6RA-5041.01)

July 17, 1998

Unit Chemical and Biological Defense Readiness Training

Executive Summary

Introduction. We conducted this audit at the request of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation and Chemical/Biological Defense. This report is the second in a series of reports on the readiness of U.S. forces to operate in a chemical and biological warfare environment. A previous report discussed chemical and biological survivability of mission-essential equipment. This report focuses on unit chemical and biological defense training. A subsequent report will discuss joint chemical and biological defense training.

Audit Objectives. The overall audit objective was to evaluate the effectiveness of chemical and biological defense readiness training among U.S. forces. Additionally, we evaluated the management control program related to the overall audit objective.

Audit Results. Except for Navy surface ships, at 187 of 232 units reviewed, unit commanders generally were not fully integrating chemical and biological defense into unit mission training. As a result, commanders could not adequately assess unit readiness to successfully complete wartime missions under chemical and biological conditions.

The management controls for reporting chemical and biological defense readiness needed improvement to ensure that chemical and biological defense is fully integrated into all levels of unit training and that readiness reporting accurately reflects the readiness of units to conduct mission-essential operations under chemical and biological conditions. See Part I for a discussion of audit results. See Appendix A for details on the management control program.

Summary of Recommendations. We recommend that the Army, the Air Force and the Marine Corps revise the format of periodic training briefings to include reports by unit commanders on the readiness of their units to conduct their wartime missions under chemical and biological conditions; require the use of internal and external evaluations in assessing unit readiness for those periodic briefings; require that support units receive evaluations of chemical and biological defense readiness similar to the evaluations received by combat units; and elevate the results of external evaluations to a higher level. We also recommend that the Navy require air squadrons to report periodically on chemical and biological defense training conducted.

Management Comments. The Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps concurred with the finding and recommendations. The Air Force concurred with recommendations to use internal and external evaluations in assessing the readiness of units to conduct their wartime missions under chemical and biological conditions, and require external evaluations of support units, stating that the Air Force is already implementing the intent of the recommendations. The Air Force nonconcurred with recommendations to revise periodic training briefings and report results of external evaluations to a higher

level within the Air Force, stating that existing procedures are adequate to assess chemical and biological defense readiness. See Part I for the discussion of management comments and Part III for the complete text of management comments.

Audit Response. We request that the Air Force reconsider its position on Recommendation 1.a. and provide additional comments to the final report by August 31, 1998.

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Part I - Audit Results

Introduction

We conducted this audit at the request of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation and Chemical/Biological Defense. This report is the second in a series of reports on the readiness of U.S. forces to operate in a chemical and biological (CB) warfare environment. A previous report discussed CB survivability of mission-essential equipment. This report focuses on unit CB defense training. A subsequent report will discuss joint CB defense training.

Audit Background

Chemical and Biological Threat. With the demise of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, the United States today stands as the world's only superpower, and it is expected to remain so throughout the 1998 to 2015 period. However, this in no way portends that the United States will not face significant security challenges during this period. U.S. dominance in the conventional military arena may encourage potential adversaries to use asymmetrical means to attack our forces and interests in the future. Foremost among these asymmetrical means is the CB warfare threat.

CB warfare agents are very potent weapons, capable of causing considerable effects over large areas. These weapons could easily be used to delay or deny our forces access to critical areas, facilities, or installations; incapacitate forward-based U.S. forces throughout a conflict; disrupt our command and control networks; deter allies and potential coalition partners from supporting U.S. intervention; or inflict higher than expected U.S. casualties in an attempt to weaken our national resolve.

Of particular concern is the spread of CB weapons, sometimes referred to as "the poor man's atomic arsenal." Recent technology has made CB weapons, and the means to deliver them, accessible to any country seeking those capabilities. Several regional powers and potential adversaries already possess CB warfare capabilities. The proliferation of CB warfare capabilities has significantly increased the probability that U.S. forces will face chemical or biological agent attack in a future conflict. Therefore, the United States must prepare its forces to confront this style of threat by ensuring that U.S. forces are prepared to defend against a CB attack, to quickly recover from the attack, and to continue mission-critical operations. The strategy to defend against CB weapons requires that U.S. forces have equipment to protect them from the effects of CB weapons and that they be properly trained in the use of the equipment in an operational environment.

Need for CB Training. The use of CB weapons could have an enormous impact on the conduct of all operations. The effects of those weapons on a campaign or major operation either through the use, or the threat of use, could cause large-scale shifts in tactical objectives, phases, and courses of action.

Soldiers are central to doctrine and warfighting ability. Their training, initiative, resilience, and understanding of the demands put on them will be key to success on the battlefield. Thus, planning for the possible use of CB weapons, and training to counter the effects, is critical to the readiness of U.S. forces. The Services have begun to recognize the increased threat of CB weapons, increasing the emphasis on training to ensure that units and personnel could accomplish their missions under CB conditions.

Service Responsibilities. Each Service is required to incorporate CB defense training into its overall training plan for individuals and units. The training should not only acquaint personnel with defensive measures but also stress proficiency in the individual's primary skill area in a CB environment.

Unit Commander Responsibilities. A unit commander has the sole responsibility for ensuring that the unit can successfully perform its wartime mission under CB conditions. Unit commanders are also the main source of CB warfare readiness assessments.

Audit Objectives

The primary audit objective was to evaluate the effectiveness of CB defense readiness training among U.S. forces. Specifically, we evaluated whether:

- o unit-level CB defense training objectives and proficiency standards were based on operations in a joint warfare environment,
- o consolidating CB defense training at the U.S. Army Chemical School met the intent of Public Law 103-160,
- o junior and senior leadership training for conducting CB warfare operations was included in course curriculum, and
- o reporting systems adequately identified the CB training readiness of U.S. forces.

We also evaluated the management control program related to the overall audit objective. Appendix A discusses the audit scope and methodology and the review of the management control program. Appendix B summarizes prior audit coverage related to the audit objectives.

Integrating CB Defense Into Unit Mission Training

Except for Navy surface units, at 187 of 232 units reviewed, unit commanders generally were not fully integrating CB defense into collective unit mission training. Training was not fully integrated because commanders did not emphasize realistic unit-level CB training, and unit-level CB readiness assessment and reporting were inadequate. As a result, unit commanders were not able to adequately assess unit readiness to continue wartime missions under CB conditions.

CB Training Guidance

Joint Guidance. Joint doctrine for CB defense outlines clear expectations for continuing mission-essential operations in a CB warfare environment. Joint Publication 3-11, "Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense," July 10, 1995, contains overall policy guidance for operations in a CB warfare environment. The policy prescribes that U.S. forces should be prepared to conduct operations in a CB warfare environment with minimal degradation. The policy recognizes that the Services are responsible for the readiness of forces to operate in a CB warfare environment and for individual training and exercises. The Services must incorporate CB defense into all levels of training in order to develop and evaluate the readiness of U.S. forces and mission-essential civilians to operate in a CB warfare environment. The policy also stresses that the Services should ensure proficiency with defensive CB equipment, materials, and procedures. In addition, the policy states that all appropriate exercises should incorporate situations with prolonged operations in a CB warfare environment.

Army Policy. Army Regulation 350-41, "Training in Units," Chapter 11, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense and Chemical Warfare Training," March 19, 1993, requires that CB defense training be:

- o designed to ensure that soldiers, leaders, and units achieve and maintain proficiency in combat operations under CB conditions;
- o conducted so that soldiers, leaders, and units achieve and maintain the standards for CB defense tasks described in mission training plans, drills, soldiers' manuals, and mission qualification standards manuals; and
- o fully integrated into unit exercises (combat, combat support, combat service support, and command and control) during offensive and defensive operations.

Navy Policy. Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3541.1E, "Surface Ship Survivability Training Requirements," March 6, 1995, requires surface ships and air squadrons to conduct CB defense exercises. In addition, Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 1500.56A, "Military Training," November 16, 1994, requires that collective training, to the degree feasible, include CB defense activity, and it also requires the periodic use of opposing forces trained in the tactics of potential adversaries.

Air Force Policy. Air Force Instruction 32-4001, "Disaster Preparedness Planning and Operations," August 1, 1997, requires that installations and assigned units demonstrate the capability to respond, operate and recover from attack under various threat scenarios, to include CB, through the use of annual exercises. In addition, the Air Force requires that personnel assigned to mobility positions receive annual refresher CB warfare defense training. The Air Force Air Combat Command Supplement to Instruction 32-4001 requires all Air Combat Command personnel to take annual refresher CB warfare defense training, not just those personnel assigned to mobility positions. The supplement also requires unit commanders to ensure specialty training includes conducting wartime tasks while in the ground crew ensemble. The Air Force did not have a policy requiring collective unit CB training. Collective unit training was at the discretion of the major command.

Marine Corps Policy. Marine Corps Order 3400.3E, "Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Defense Training," December 10, 1993, requires that unit commanders train to ensure their units are capable of surviving in and conducting their missions under CB conditions. The Order also requires that CB defense training be integrated into Marine Corps combat, combat support, combat service support, and command and control exercises during offensive and defensive operations and live-fire exercises.

Collective Unit CB Training

Developing Collective Training Objectives. Collective training refers to developing in a group of soldiers those interdependencies and teamwork that go to make up team performance. Collective training is decentralized and performance oriented. Performance-oriented collective training is training units to do the same tasks or missions that they will do in wartime, and to do them well enough to ensure success on the battlefield. Training is conducted to obtain the objective. Major commands provided unit commanders training objectives that were defined in broad terms. Command training guidance required unit commanders to fully integrate CB defense into all levels of unit training, including collective training events. At the battalion and squadron levels, unit commanders' training objectives were specific and targeted to train to each unit's mission-essential wartime tasking. The unit commander was primarily responsible for determining what training would be accomplished and the conditions under which the training would be conducted.

Input from Theater Commanders. Theater commanders do not provide any input to the Services on CB defense training or possible scenarios that units should train for. The Services train to provide a specified capability to theater commanders. Theater commanders and the Services acknowledge that CB will be a likely operational environment and, therefore, units should train to accomplish their wartime missions under CB conditions. Units use information obtained from threat briefings and participation in joint training exercises in determining possible CB defense scenarios.

Unit CB Training

Except for Navy surface units, unit commanders generally were not fully integrating CB defense into collective unit mission training exercises. The requirement to fully integrate CB defense training with unit mission training includes conducting combat, combat support, combat service support, and command and control exercises and includes performing mission-essential tasks under CB conditions that are as realistic as possible. Although the Services require units to fully integrate CB defense training into all levels of unit mission training and field exercises, units rarely trained for their mission-essential tasks under CB conditions. Of 232 units reviewed, only 45 units participated in collective unit mission training under realistic CB conditions. For the remaining 187 units, 4 did not conduct any CB defense training. Although all but four units conducted some form of unit CB defense training, the scope and duration of CB defense training was typically limited, such that the training was not realistic to mission requirement. Unit CB training focused more on individual task training that was conducted as discrete training events rather than unit training that was integrated with mission training events. Collective training events and field exercises rarely included participation of the entire unit and many training events did not require unit personnel to train to standards. Unit personnel cited the need to evaluate and report on unit readiness to successfully complete mission-essential tasks as their first priority. Personnel also stated that safety concerns, deployment schedules, and other tasks did not allow units to fully integrate CB situations into mission training exercises.

Integrating CB Defense Training. The Army and the Marine Corps integrated CB defense training mostly in company and smaller sized units. The Navy integrated CB defense training into surface unit training exercises. However, Navy air units had little, if any, integrated CB defense training. The Air Force primarily conducted CB defense training in a classroom environment.

Army Unit-Level CB Training. Approximately one-third of battalion- or company-level units reviewed conducted training that fully integrated CB defense with mission training. Of 59 Army battalions reviewed, 19 battalions fully integrated CB defense into battalion mission training exercises. Of the 19 battalions, 3 conducted defensive and offensive operations during battalion-level field training exercises over a 3- to 4-day period while sustaining operations under CB conditions. We considered battalion-level training fully

integrated if the exercise included performing mission-essential operations under CB conditions and if all companies in the battalion conducted the exercise, although it may have been at different times. The other 16 battalions integrated CB defense into evaluation training exercises at Army off-post training locations.

Individually Focused CB Training. The majority of Army unit-level CB defense training focused on individual common tasks during periodic training periods. Typically, Army units conducted CB defense training at the squad and team levels. Squads and teams rotated through the periodic CB training events, either during classroom or field training exercises. Classroom training included mask confidence, equipment familiarization, and report preparation. CB defense training conducted during field training exercises included donning protective equipment, self aid and buddy care, crossing a contaminated area, decontamination, and mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear exchange. In those cases where CB defense training was conducted during unit field training exercises, the CB defense phase of the training was conducted during time specifically set aside for that purpose. The CB training was not integrated with the unit mission training exercise. The most intensive CB defense field training examples cited by units was "lane training." Lane training is a technique for training primarily company team-level and smaller units on a series of selected soldier, leader, and collective tasks using specific terrain. Lane training uses multiechelon techniques to maximize the efficient use of limited terrain and control conditions for formal and informal evaluations. Lane training also applies to rotating through stationary standardized training and evaluation sites. The latter round-robin technique was used for CB defense field training by many Army team-level units. While this type of CB defense training can be effective, only small numbers of personnel from the battalion participated. We did not consider lane training as fully integrated with unit mission training. While unit commanders stated that more could be done to improve collective CB training in their units, they also stated that emphasis on individual CB tasks was important because soldiers need to master the individual tasks in order to operate proficiently under CB conditions collectively as a unit.

Army Off-Post Training. Most Army installations that we visited had training cycles that included off-post evaluation exercises as the final training event in the unit's training cycle. The off-post evaluation exercises were conducted during the unit's scheduled rotation to one of the Army's combat training centers. Of 59 battalions, 16 stated that was the only time that the battalion fully integrated CB defense with unit wartime mission training.

Army Combat Training Centers. The Army operates three combat training centers: the Combat Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany; the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. The combat training centers provide battalion and brigade sized units the opportunity to increase collective proficiency in conducting their wartime missions on the most realistic battlefield available during peacetime. The Army tries to ensure

Integrating CB Defense Into Unit Mission Training

that all units rotate to one of the combat training centers at 18-month intervals. Independent observers at the training centers evaluate units on their overall training readiness to conduct wartime missions. The combat training centers routinely evaluate the ability of combat battalions and brigades to conduct wartime missions under CB conditions. However, not all units participated in CB situations during their evaluation at the combat training centers.

Combat Training Center Trend Data. Combat training center trend data for 4th quarter 1994 through 2nd quarter 1997 indicated that Army battalions continued to have problems conducting operations under CB conditions. Problems reported included knowledge of CB operations, control of marked contaminated areas, employment of M8A1 alarms, improper use of chemical noncommissioned officers, and reaction to chemical attacks. Observers at the combat training centers concluded that the main causes for chemical casualties were the lack of early warning, non-compliance with directed force protection measures, and not following established battle drills. Units sustained significant casualties because they failed to properly employ their chemical agent alarms. Alarms were employed, but not checked to ensure proper operation. The improper employment of alarms resulted in no early warning for units and the loss of soldiers. In addition, soldiers arrived at the combat training centers without MOPP gear and did not always understand the different levels of MOPP. Operational and thorough decontamination operations were not planned or executed to standard. Follow-on forces continued to pile into the contamination, violating the principal of contamination avoidance. Chemical noncommissioned officers were not used properly in company-level through brigade-level units. At the company level, chemical noncommissioned officers were not put in positions to accomplish their jobs. At the battalion and brigade levels, the chemical noncommissioned officers got involved in operational duties with little time to conduct CB duties.

Navy Surface Unit CB Training. Overall, Navy surface ships fully integrated CB defense into unit mission training. Of 23 Navy surface ships reviewed, 19 ships fully integrated CB defense training into mission training. Three surface units were special boat units that did not have an operational requirement in a CB threat environment. One ship conducted only individual training. The Navy requires that all surface ships carry a current Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Defense Bill. The CBR Defense Bill is a detailed plan for phased implementation of chemical warfare countermeasures intended to ensure ships can carry out their assigned missions under CB conditions. The CBR Defense Bill prescribes procedures and assigns responsibilities for defensive measures against a CB attack and also prescribes methods to be used in minimizing damage and personnel casualties resulting from CB contamination. Each CBR Defense Bill is unique to the type of ship. The CBR Defense Bill identifies specific officers and enlisted personnel and tasks them with training the ship's crew in CB defense procedures. A ship's damage control personnel have the primary responsibility for ensuring that proper actions are taken to ensure the survivability of the crew and ship in the event of a CB attack. Ships must conduct CB defense drills quarterly to practice procedures detailed in the ship's CBR Defense Bill.

Training Teams. Because a ship has many different functional areas, the CBR Defense Bill tasks specific personnel by functional area to train crew members to perform their wartime missions under CB conditions. For example, the combat systems officer on a destroyer "instructs gun, torpedo, and missile crews in the use of individual protective equipment and trains them in the operation of ship's weapons systems while wearing the highest level of personal protection, to include rain gear over chemical protective overgarment." A ship's damage control assistant supervises the training of the damage control training team in the proper procedures for training the ship's crew in a CB environment. The damage control assistant also proposes suitable battle situations to allow evaluation of ship personnel under simulated CB attack.

CB Defense Drills. We considered quarterly CB defense drills conducted by 19 ships as fully integrated CB training. Shipwide CB defense drills simulated threat conditions, up to and including a direct chemical attack on the ship, and set in motion the procedures specified in a ship's CBR Defense Bill. The damage control training team, which consisted of 12 to 15 individuals, used a scored checklist to evaluate a drill and provided the checklist to the commanding officer for use in identifying areas needing attention. In addition to the quarterly drills, the Navy's Afloat Training Group Atlantic/Pacific conducted an independent assessment of shipwide CB defense drills every 18 months. The internal and external assessments provided good feedback to the units on their ability to successfully complete wartime missions under CB conditions.

Navy Air Unit CB Training. Of 29 Navy air squadrons reviewed, none fully integrated CB defense into unit mission training. Typically, Navy air squadrons did not conduct CB training. The exception was carrier-based air squadrons, which received refresher training once aboard the aircraft carrier. The CB defense training provided to air squadrons by ship personnel is limited to when and how to put on the gas mask and other protective clothing. Navy air squadrons participate in carrier CB defense drills, but participation is limited to wearing the gas mask.

Air Force Unit-Level CB Training. Of 74 Air Force squadrons reviewed, none had fully integrated CB defense into mission training at the squadron level. One unit did not have a mobility mission and therefore did not conduct any CB defense training. Air Force policy does not require that CB defense be integrated into collective training at the squadron level. CB defense at squadron level focused on classroom instruction and individual task training. However, 18 of the remaining 73 squadrons partially integrated CB defense into mission-specific unit training exercises. Those squadrons participated in a combination of flag exercises, readiness exercises, and unit specialty training that included CB exercise scenarios. According to Air Force personnel, the amount of CB training included in those exercises was limited, but the training did provide the squadrons with additional mission-specific CB defense training.

Integrating CB Defense Into Unit Mission Training

Classroom instruction and individual task training were the primary types of CB defense training for Air Force personnel. Classroom training consisted of 4 to 6 hours of mandatory annual CB warfare defense refresher training. The annual refresher training included some hands-on training. Topics covered in the training classes included proper wearing of individual protective equipment, attack reporting procedures, contamination control area processing procedures, and mask confidence training. Typically, Air Force squadrons relied on the annual CB warfare defense refresher training and wing-level evaluation exercises to provide the CB training needed to conduct wartime missions under CB conditions.

Air Force Wing-Level Evaluation Exercises. Of 74 Air Force squadrons reviewed, 60 participated in wing-level evaluation exercises. The remaining 14 squadrons were exempt from participating because they did not have a mobility mission, they deployed independent of the wing, or they had deployment obligations that prevented their participation. Of the 60 squadrons that participated in the wing-level exercises, 42 indicated that the exercises were the only opportunity they had to integrate CB defense with unit mission training, and that the only other CB defense training for their unit was the annual classroom training. Although squadrons participated in wing-level exercises, the scope of CB situations during the exercises and the amount of time any one squadron had to demonstrate its ability to continue mission-essential operations under CB conditions were limited. We reviewed 19 wing-level exercise evaluation reports at 9 locations. The exercise evaluation reports rarely provided an assessment of a squadron's ability to accomplish its wartime tasks under CB conditions. The evaluation results were reported by functional area. Of 51 squadrons reviewed at the 9 locations, only 6 squadrons received specific CB defense evaluations of their participation in wing-level exercises. While other squadron personnel indicated that they participated in CB situations during the exercises, the scope of the exercise may have only required personnel to demonstrate that they knew when and how to put on their protective equipment and use detection paper. Also, all personnel from the squadron did not participate in wing-level exercises. Typically, only those personnel assigned to mobility positions within the unit participated. The participation rate for a typical wing-level exercise ranged from 3 percent to 100 percent of unit personnel. Although wing-level exercises provide an excellent opportunity to demonstrate operational readiness for a CB threat scenario, there is a wide gap between classroom training and the wing evaluation exercises.

Marine Corps Unit-Level CB Training. Of 47 Marine Corps battalions and squadrons reviewed, only 7 fully integrated CB defense into mission training exercises at the battalion level. Five of the seven units that fully integrated CB defense were Marine combat battalions. Although combat units were more likely to integrate CB defense with unit mission training exercises, the level at which the training was integrated and the scope of the CB training included was not consistent for all battalions. The seven battalions that fully integrated CB defense conducted field training exercises with evaluation of a battalion's ability to conduct defensive and offensive operations under CB conditions. The

exercise included mission-oriented actions prior to, during, and after a chemical attack. The battalion-level training was supplemented with company- and platoon-level field training conducting defensive, offensive, and night exercises under CB conditions. An additional 18 Marine Corps battalions partially integrated CB defense into unit mission training at the company level and below. We considered CB defense partially integrated if the battalion had at least one company or platoon that conducted field training that included conducting defensive and offensive mission exercises under CB conditions.

Mission-Oriented Task Training. Of 47 Marine Corps battalions and squadrons reviewed, 22 conducted mission-oriented task (MOT) training. MOT training is a form of integrated CB defense training in which unit personnel conduct their normal day-to-day operations while in various MOPP levels. The purpose of the training is to ensure personnel can perform their job functions in a contaminated environment. While MOT training should be done in conjunction with normal unit operations and events, most units conducted MOT training as a separate event with safety restrictions placed on the operations that personnel conducted. Units conducted MOT training quarterly. Although units preferred to do this type of training, it was not considered fully integrated because only 40 to 50 personnel participated during any one quarter. In addition, some jobs were not performed in MOPP gear for safety reasons. Mechanics did not work on aircraft; drivers did not drive vehicles; and pilots and crews did not conduct flying operations.

CB Defense Team Training. The most common form of collective training events where Marine Corps units conducted CB defense training was CB defense team training. The purpose of team training is to prepare specialized CB defense teams to provide the skills and functions necessary for a unit to react, respond to, and recover quickly from a CB attack. CB defense teams allow units to perform the specific CB tasks assigned to them in their mission performance standards and to survive in a CB environment. CB defense teams made up only a small portion of a unit. They received training in one of three categories of CB operations: control center, decontamination, or monitor/survey. CB defense team training did not prepare a unit to perform its wartime mission under CB conditions. It only prepared the CB defense teams to perform those specific CB tasks assigned to the teams.

The Marine Corps has a CB Incident Response Force that provides specialized training to elements of Marine expeditionary units. Only those Marine expeditionary unit teams responsible for control center, decontamination, and monitor/survey, and medical casualty operations received this specialized training.

Marine Air Wing CB Training Requirements. Marine air wing personnel were not obtaining required CB training. Marine air wing squadron personnel have an additional training requirement to conduct annual flight operations in MOPP gear. The annual requirement is for pilots and crews to conduct training for 1 hour in a flight simulator and 1 hour of actual flight time.

Of nine Marine air squadron personnel who had an annual requirement for 1 hour of flight time in MOPP gear, six squadron personnel conducted the required training. Fixed-wing Marine air crew members cannot conduct this training because they do not have the proper flight gear; the CB gear issued to air crew personnel is incompatible with fixed-wing aircraft. The issue was being worked by the Marine Corps and new compatible equipment was under development.

Emphasis and Reporting on CB Readiness

Some units, like the Navy surface ships, did accomplish realistic training; other Services and units did not. We attributed this to a lack of command emphasis on realistic training and inadequate assessment and reporting of unit CB readiness.

Command Emphasis on Mission-Essential Tasks. Because CB training could impact accomplishment of mission-essential tasks, emphasis was not placed on realistic CB training. All units had mission-essential tasks that identified the critical wartime objectives that they must be proficient in to successfully accomplish their missions. Service guidance provides for evaluating the risks in conducting realistic training. For example, Army Regulation 350-41 states that major commands can add to or emphasize certain training requirements, but care should be taken not to degrade mission-essential task list-focused training. Unit commanders view training on their mission-essential tasks as their primary responsibility. Unit commanders report periodically on the status of unit readiness to accomplish mission-essential tasks. If unit commanders view integrating CB defense training into field training exercises as limiting their ability to evaluate their primary wartime mission, then CB training will not be integrated. It will continue to be conducted as discrete training events.

Assessing and Reporting CB Readiness. Except for Navy surface units, unit-level CB defense readiness assessment and reporting did not provide adequate measures and feedback to determine whether units could successfully complete their wartime missions under CB conditions. Unit proficiency is determined by having the unit perform its wartime mission under simulated CB conditions during internal and external evaluations. Each of the Services had mechanisms for both internal and external evaluations of unit proficiency. However, the evaluations were not used in determining the CB defense readiness of units for reporting purposes.

Army. Although Army procedures require readiness assessments at all levels of training, few Army units reviewed had internal evaluations of company- or battalion-level exercises under CB conditions. Nor did they have evaluations of separately conducted CB defense training events in the unit. Unit commanders typically did not prepare written assessments based on CB defense training conducted within their units. In discussing CB training, and readiness to conduct wartime missions under CB conditions, unit commanders, training

personnel, and unit chemical personnel stated that written assessments were rarely made. They stated that after-action reports for training events and exercises consisted of informal briefings or verbal discussions when the training was completed. Battalion- and company-sized units were more likely to receive CB readiness assessments if they participated in division-level exercises or participated in CB scenarios during rotation to one of the combat training centers. Because the combat training centers focus on combat battalions and brigades, those units typically participated in CB scenarios and thus received a written assessment of their CB defense readiness. Combat support and combat service support battalions did not always participate in CB scenarios at the combat training centers, so they were less likely to receive a CB readiness assessment. Of 59 battalions reviewed, 16 received combat training center evaluations that included CB defense readiness assessments. The combat training center evaluations remained with unit commanders for their use in improving CB defense training when they returned to their home station. No one other than the unit commander saw the written evaluation. Theoretically, external evaluations of CB defense readiness should be a factor in the commander's unit-level assessment. However, the evaluations were not used as intended. As a result, new unit commanders, chemical officers, and chemical noncommissioned officers did not have the information they needed to assess unit CB defense readiness and to determine those areas needing the most attention.

Navy. Shipboard damage control training teams provided the internal evaluation of Navy surface ship CB defense training readiness. The training team provided a scored evaluation of the results of shipwide CB defense drills to the commanding officer for use in focusing CB defense training or revising CB defense procedures. Every 18 months, damage control officers assigned to the Navy's Afloat Training Group provided the external evaluation of a ship's CB defense readiness and provided the official results to the commanding officer. A copy of the Afloat Training Group's graded evaluation was also sent to the type commander. Type commanders establish training and readiness standards, and monitor the training readiness of each ship throughout its deployment cycle. The graded evaluation assigns a numerical rating for each rating factor against a maximum point total. Afloat Training Group personnel stated that the graded evaluation gives the commanding officer objective feedback on the status of the ship's readiness to conduct operations under CB conditions.

Navy air squadrons did not receive separate CB defense readiness assessments. Because the air squadron's wartime mission is integrated with the aircraft carrier's mission, the CB defense readiness assessment is made for the aircraft carrier as an integrated unit.

Air Force. The Air Force used wing-level exercises to assess CB defense readiness of Air Force squadrons. Air Force Instruction 90-201, "Inspector General Activities," January 1, 1996, provides for evaluating Air Force personnel on their "ability to survive and operate" during operational readiness inspection exercises. The evaluation "encompasses all measures taken to protect, recover, and restore resources for combat use from threat situations.

Integrating CB Defense Into Unit Mission Training

Threat situations may include but are not limited to: . . . chemical/biological attack” Wings typically conducted a 3-day exercise to prepare for the operational readiness inspection. The ability to survive and operate under CB conditions was often one of the factors evaluated. Wing exercises were run by wing exercise evaluation teams. The goal of the exercise evaluation team was to ensure readiness of the wing to conduct wartime operations. One of the exercise evaluation team’s primary objectives was to identify ways to improve unit performance and capabilities. However, the reports primarily addressed wing functional areas and rarely provided information specific to any particular squadron’s ability to successfully conduct wartime missions under CB conditions. The exercise evaluation reports indicated the need for more CB defense training at the unit level. However, the only CB defense training most Air Force squadrons received at unit level was the annual refresher training. Only civil engineering squadrons reported unit-level CB readiness information. Other Air Force squadrons reported monthly on the number of persons in the unit that completed annual CB refresher training.

Marine Corps. The Marine Corps used the Marine Corps Combat Readiness and Evaluation System to assess the readiness of its units to operate under CB conditions. This evaluation system provided training feedback up and down the chain of command. It allowed commanders to identify training deficiencies, to assess the effectiveness of their training programs, and to revise training programs to increase combat proficiency. Units that were required to be evaluated under the combat readiness and evaluation system were evaluated every 2 years or prior to a deployment. Those units that were not required to be evaluated under the combat readiness and evaluations system participated in annual or biennial operational readiness exercises established by major subordinate commands to ensure that the units were maintaining the level of proficiency required to survive and continue their missions under CB conditions. Operational readiness evaluations took place during field exercises and, for many Marine Corps units, the field exercises were the only source of integrated CB defense training that they received.

Although all Marine Corps units evaluated since 1993 were rated as mission capable for CB defense, the Marine Corps readiness and evaluation system did not provide an accurate assessment of unit CB defense readiness. Of the 47 battalions and squadrons reviewed, only 4 were evaluated on their ability to conduct mission-essential tasks in a fully integrated exercise under CB conditions. Of the remaining 43 battalions and squadrons, 18 were evaluated with only 1 company or smaller sized unit participating; 21 were evaluated on individual CB defense skills and the ability of the unit’s CB defense teams to perform their control center, decontamination, or monitor/survey missions; and 4 did not receive any evaluation.

Global Status of Resources and Training System. Although the Global Status of Resources and Training System has the capability to highlight CB defense readiness of reporting units, most units were not including unit-level CB defense training assessments when reporting readiness assessments. The Global Status of Resources and Training System is the single, automated report that provides

the Joint Staff, theater commanders, and the Services with the equipment and training status of reporting units. The Joint Staff agreed, in a memorandum dated October 29, 1992, to revise reporting procedures to require mandatory reporting of CB defense equipment and training status. The Joint Staff agreement resulted from mediation between the Office of the Inspector General, DoD, and the Joint Staff to implement an audit recommendation in Inspector General, DoD, Report No. 92-123, "Chemical and Biological Readiness Reporting," June 30, 1992. The report states that DoD decisionmakers did not have adequate CB defense data when making deployment and procurement decisions for Operation Desert Shield. As a result of the Joint Staff agreement, revised reporting procedures are now included in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3401.02, "Global Status of Resources and Training System," October 20, 1997. That Instruction states that "measured units will independently assess their ability to accomplish their mission in a chemical and biological environment." Reported information will be based on Service-identified training events that must be completed within specified intervals for a fully trained unit.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Audit Responses

Deleted Recommendation. As a result of management comments, and review of referenced documents, we deleted draft Recommendation 1. to the Joint Staff. The finding text was changed accordingly. Draft Recommendations 2. and 3. have been renumbered 1. and 2., respectively.

1. We recommend that the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps:

a. Revise periodic training briefings to include reports by unit commanders on the readiness of their units to conduct wartime missions under chemical and biological conditions.

b. Require that the results of internal and external evaluations be used by unit commanders in assessing unit readiness to conduct wartime missions under chemical and biological conditions.

c. Require that support units receive external evaluations of chemical and biological defense readiness similar to the evaluations of combat units.

d. Require that the results of external evaluations of unit chemical and biological defense readiness be elevated to a higher level within the Services.

Department of the Army Comments. The Army concurred, stating that it will assess training under CB conditions as part of quarterly and semi-annual training briefs; reemphasize that readiness assessments will be based on the results of internal and external evaluations; and report results of external evaluations to two levels higher. The Army also stated that support units are currently required to receive external evaluations of CB defense readiness.

Department of the Air Force Comments. The Air Force concurred with Recommendations 1.b. and 1.c., stating that the Air Force is already implementing the intent of the recommendations through the use of operational readiness inspections, which are conducted for support units as well as combat units. The Air Force nonconcurred with Recommendation 1.a., stating that the Air Force uses the Global Status of Resources and Training System reporting as its periodic training briefing. The Air Force stated that the Global Status of Resources and Training System report is used to inform major commands of unit readiness capabilities. The Air Force also nonconcurred with Recommendation 1.d., stating that the Inspector General, Air Staff, monitors the results of Air Force Operational Readiness Inspections.

Audit Response. The Department of the Air Force comments are not responsive to Recommendation 1.a. The Global Status of Resources and Training System should not be used in lieu of training briefings since Air Force unit-level personnel stated that information provided for Global Status of Resources and Training System reporting only includes the percentage of unit-level personnel who completed annual classroom training for CB defense. Annual classroom training is not comparable to realistic unit-level wartime mission accomplishment in a CB environment. Although the Air Force nonconcurred with Recommendation 1.d., we consider its comments responsive because external evaluations are monitored at the Air Staff level. We request the Air Force reconsider its comments to Recommendation 1.a. and provide additional comments in its response to the final report.

Marine Corps Comments. The Marine Corps concurred, stating that unit commanders currently conduct periodic briefings on the readiness of their units to conduct wartime missions under CB conditions. The Marine Corps also stated that it uses the results of the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System and the Marine Corps Inspector General Readiness Assessment Team visits in assessing unit readiness and capabilities under CB conditions. External evaluations also include support units, with the results of all external evaluations reported through the chain-of-command to Headquarters, Marine Corps.

2. We recommend that the Chief of Naval Operations require air squadrons to report periodically to the appropriate Naval Air Forces Commander on chemical and biological defense training conducted.

Department of the Navy Comments. The Navy concurred, stating that the Naval Air Systems Command is addressing the issue of squadron training and reporting.

Part II - Additional Information

Appendix A. Audit Process

Scope

We reviewed unit-level CB defense training for active Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps operational units. We focused our review on how unit commanders integrated CB defense into unit training exercises, the scope and frequency of training, and CB defense readiness assessments. We reviewed and evaluated Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandums and publications dated from October 1992 through July 1995, and Service and installation-level training guidance dated from March 1993 through August 1997. We reviewed regularly scheduled training and exercise events, supplemental CB defense training guidance issued at the unit level, unit training plans, after-action reports, and readiness inspection reports as they related to CB defense training for the period FY 1996 to FY 1997. To determine how units trained and how commanders assessed the CB defense readiness of their units to successfully perform their wartime missions, we also interviewed division- and wing-level personnel, unit commanders, and unit personnel responsible for implementing and monitoring unit CB defense training.

To determine that consolidation of CB defense training at the U.S. Army Chemical School met the intent of Public Law 103-160, we reviewed the School's training programs, attendance, and curriculum. We also interviewed personnel at the Army Chemical School and personnel at the Service schools collocated at the site. We determined that CB defense training at the Service schools was Service-unique. In addition, we determined that junior and senior leadership training for conducting CB warfare operations was included in course curriculum, however, additional efforts are underway to include more training courses for senior-level personnel.

We reviewed trend data from the Center for Army Lessons Learned on CB defense training for 4th quarter 1994 through 2nd quarter 1997. The trend data included observations of approximately 10 brigades at the National Training Center and approximately 25 brigades at the Joint Readiness Training Center.

In assessing the extent of integrated training in the Army, we did not review any Army units in Europe.

Methodology

Audit Universe. The audit universe included active Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps operational units. The Services provided the number and location of units meeting that criteria. The resulting sample universe included

452 Army battalions, 319 Navy units (228 surface ships and 91 air squadrons), 857 Air Force squadrons, and 217 Marine Corps units (80 battalions and 137 air squadrons), for a total of 1,835 units from which we drew our sample.

Sampling Plan. We applied a two-stage design to the audit universe provided by the Services. In the first stage, we selected locations using the probability proportional to size method, with replacement.^{*} This method counts the number of units in a given group to establish an "a priori" probability of a sample being drawn from that group. For example, there are 452 Army units in all, with 57 located at Fort Bragg. This gives the Fort Bragg location a 57/452 or 0.126 chance of being selected. Once the number of sample and location combinations for the first stage had been chosen, we drew a simple random sample of units from those locations for each first-stage sample and location. We then selected units without replacement (a given battalion or squadron could only be selected once). Where the first-stage samples required more units than were available at a location, we used five randomly drawn units for the first sample and the remainder for the second.

The sample as selected worked out as follows. From the Army, reporting 452 units, we selected 20 clusters of 5 units. The units came from 10 locations. From the Navy, reporting 319 units, we selected 10 clusters of 5 air units each and 10 of 5 surface units each. The Navy units came from 12 locations. From the Air Force, reporting 857 units, we selected 20 clusters of 5 units at 16 locations. From the Marine Corps, reporting 217 units, we selected 6 clusters of 5 ground units and 6 clusters of 5 air units. The units came from 8 locations. In the case of the Navy, the number of units for some selected locations exceeded the number available at the location. For those locations we sampled all units available. The number and location of units included in the sample are shown in Appendix C.

Sample Results. The sample results are shown in the finding section of the report. The sample design demonstrates that there was no bias toward selecting units for testing that had problems. The training findings come from a representative cross section of units selected with no foreknowledge of their training status. Due to resource constraints and unit availability (a number were deployed), we visited 167 units and collected documents by correspondence from another 65. Among these 232 units, 187 were not fully integrating CB defense into unit mission training. Because of the complex sample design, this ratio (187 of 232) should not be used directly. Nevertheless, it is a strong indicator of CB defense training conditions across the Department.

Use of Technical Assistance. The audit used technical assistance provided by the Quantitative Methods Division, Office of the Inspector General, DoD, in developing the methodology and in selecting and analyzing the statistical sample for the audit.

^{*}Each group can be selected more than once in the first stage probability proportional to size sample.

DoD-Wide Corporate Level Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) Goals. In response to the GPRA, the DoD has established 6 DoD-wide corporate level performance objectives and 14 goals for meeting those objectives. This report pertains to achievement of the following objective and goal.

- **Objective:** Maintain highly ready joint forces to perform the full spectrum of military activities.
- **Goal:** Maintain high military personnel and unit readiness. (DoD-5.1)

Audit Type, Dates, and Standards. We performed this program results audit from May 1997 through January 1998 in accordance with auditing standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States, as implemented by the Inspector General, DoD. We included tests of management controls considered necessary. We did not use computer-processed data for this audit.

Contacts During the Audit. We visited or contacted individuals and organizations within the DoD. Further details are available upon request.

Management Control Program

DoD Directive 5010.38, "Management Control (MC) Program," August 26, 1996, requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of management controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the adequacy of the controls.

Scope of Review of the Management Control Program. We reviewed the adequacy of management controls related to CB defense training at the unit level. We also reviewed procedures for after-action reviews and evaluated management's use of training assessment reports. In addition, we reviewed exercise evaluation reports and command inspection reports to determine how those reports were used by unit commanders to improve CB defense readiness training.

Adequacy of Management Controls. The audit identified material management control weaknesses as defined by DoD Directive 5010.38. Except for Navy surface units, management controls were not adequate to ensure that Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps unit commanders fully integrated CB defense with unit mission training. Although the Services required training assessments at different levels, results of those assessments were not used in the overall reporting of unit CB defense readiness training. Recommendations in this report, if implemented, will ensure that CB defense is fully integrated with unit mission training and that readiness reports more accurately reflect the ability of units to conduct wartime missions under CB conditions. A copy of the report will be provided to the senior official responsible for management controls in the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.

Adequacy of Management's Self-Evaluation. Management officials identified training as an assessable unit, but did not separately identify CB defense. Therefore, management did not identify or report the material management control weaknesses identified by the audit.

Appendix B. Summary of Prior Coverage

During the last 5 years, the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Office of the Inspector General, DoD, issued reports that specifically discussed CB defense readiness.

General Accounting Office

GAO Report No. NSIAD-98-83, "Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on DoD's Plans to Protect U.S. Forces," June 13, 1997. The report documents testimony given by the GAO before the Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs. In its testimony, the GAO reported shortages in individual protective equipment, inadequate CB agent detection devices, inadequate command emphasis on CB capabilities, and deficiencies in medical personnel training. The testimony also cited DoD on its slower than planned progress in CB research, inadequate training, short stocks in vaccines for biological agents, and insufficient training and equipment for medical personnel. It did, however, cite advances in developing improved individual protection systems and CB detection equipment. According to the GAO testimony, the most critical challenges are inadequate DoD doctrine and policy for CB defense of overseas airfields and ports, as well as the return of contaminated personnel (to include civilians), material, ships, and aircraft; insufficient quantities of biological agent vaccines; and generally insufficient collective protection facilities, equipment, and agent detection systems.

GAO Report No. NSIAD-96-103 (OSD Case No. 1099), "Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems," March 29, 1996. The report states that many early deploying active and Reserve units lacked required CB defense equipment, and new equipment development and procurement were often proceeding more slowly than planned. Furthermore, many units were not trained to existing standards, and military medical capability to prevent and treat casualties on a contaminated battlefield was very limited. Although DoD had taken actions to improve CB defense since the Gulf War, problems remained due to limited emphasis. DoD funding, staffing, mission priority, and monitoring showed that CB defense tended to be relegated a lower level of priority than other threat areas. GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense reevaluate the priority and emphasis given to this area throughout DoD. GAO also recommended the Secretary, in his next annual report to Congress on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare Defense, address proposed solutions to the deficiencies identified and the impact that shifting additional resources to this area might have on other military priorities. GAO further recommended that the Secretary of Defense take specific actions designed to improve the effectiveness of existing activities.

DoD generally agreed with the findings and recommendations. DoD stated it had recently increased the emphasis and funding given to CB defense and had begun a number of initiatives that were expected to address many of the problems identified.

Inspector General, DoD

Inspector General, DoD, Report No. 97-217, "Chemical and Biological Defense Readiness," September 19, 1997. The report is classified. The audit was conducted at the request of Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation and Chemical/Biological Defense. The audit objective was to evaluate the effectiveness of the DoD CB contamination survivability program. The report contained the following recommendations.

- o The most probable scenarios for CB warfare operations should be identified.
- o Threat-based CB warfare defense training exercises and objectives should be developed at the theater and installation levels that incorporate tactics, techniques, and procedures that take into account limitations of systems and equipment to operate in a CB environment.
- o A joint concept that prioritizes survivability of mission-critical systems and equipment based on need to operate in a CB environment should be established.
- o Joint survivability standards that include minimum CB survivability criteria for mission-critical systems and equipment should be developed.
- o Procedures to document and track the CB survivability of mission-critical systems and equipment should be developed.

Management concurred with the recommendations.

Appendix C. Number and Location of Units Reviewed

<u>Location</u>	<u>Number of Units Selected for Review</u>	<u>Method of Review</u>		<u>Not Reviewed</u>
		<u>Visited</u>	<u>Correspondence</u>	
<u>Army</u>				
Fort Bragg, NC	20	17	--	3
Fort Campbell, KY	10	7	2	1
Fort Carson, CO	5	--	5	--
Fort Hood, TX	10	9	--	1
Fort Lewis, WA	5	5	--	--
Fort Riley, KS	5	4	--	1
Fort Sill, OK	5	4	--	1
Hunter Army Airfield, GA	5	4	--	1
U.S. Army Forces Europe	30	--	1	--
U.S. Army Forces Korea	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>30</u>
Subtotal	100	51	8	41
<u>Navy</u>				
Bremerton, WA	5	3	--	2
Guam	3	--	1	2
Ingleside, TX	5	--	--	5
Jacksonville, FL	7	--	7	--
La Maddalena, Italy	1	--	--	1
Little Creek, VA	7	5	--	2
Mayport, FL	5	--	--	5
Norfolk, VA	24	8	9	7
Oceana, VA	5	--	5	--
Pasagoula, MS	5	--	3	2

Appendix C. Number and Location of Units Reviewed

<u>Location</u>	<u>Number of Units Selected for Review</u>	<u>Method of Review</u>		<u>Not Reviewed</u>
		<u>Visited</u>	<u>Correspondence</u>	
<u>Navy (Continued)</u>				
San Diego, CA	7	6	--	1
Whidbey Island, WA	<u>9</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>4</u>
Subtotal	83	27	25	31
<u>Air Force</u>				
Cannon AFB, ¹ NM	5	5	--	--
Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ	5	5	--	--
Fairchild AFB, WA	5	4	--	1
Grand Forks AFB, ND	5	--	5	--
Hickam AFB, HI	5	--	--	5
Hill AFB, UT	5	--	2	3
Holloman AFB, NM	5	5	--	--
Kadena AB, ² Japan	10	--	--	10
Kunsan AB, Korea	5	5	--	--
Langley AFB, VA	5	4	--	1
MacDill AFB, FL	5	5	--	--
McGuire AFB, NJ	10	8	--	2
Moody AFB, GA	10	10	--	--
Nellis AFB, NV	5	--	4	1
Ramstein AB, Germany	10	--	9	1
Travis AFB, CA	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>2</u>
Subtotal	100	54	20	26

¹AFB is an acronym for Air Force Base.

²AB is an acronym for Air Base.

Appendix C. Number and Location of Units Reviewed

<u>Location</u>	<u>Number of Units Selected for Review</u>	<u>Method of Review</u>		<u>Not Reviewed</u>
		<u>Visited</u>	<u>Correspondence</u>	
<u>Marine Corps</u>				
Camp Lejeune, NC	10	8	1	1
Camp Pendleton, CA	10	7	3	--
MCAS ³ Iwakuni, Japan	5	--	--	5
MCAS Camp Pendleton/ NAS ⁴ Miramar, CA	10	7	--	3
MCAS New River, NC	10	9	1	--
Okinawa, Japan	10	--	6	4
MCAS Tustin/EI Toro, CA	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>--</u>
Subtotal	60	35	12	13
Total	343	167	65	111

³MCAS is an acronym for Marine Corps Air Station.

⁴NAS is an acronym for Naval Air Station.

Appendix D. Report Distribution

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
 Deputy Chief Financial Officer
 Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation and
 Chemical/Biological Defense
Director, Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange

Joint Staff

Director, Joint Staff
 Director for Operations (J-3)
 Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5)

Department of the Army

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans
Commander, Training and Doctrine Command
 Commander, U.S. Army Chemical School
Auditor General, Department of the Army

Department of the Navy

Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Auditor General, Department of the Navy

Marine Corps

Commandant of the Marine Corps
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Department of the Air Force

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations
Chief, Office of the Civil Engineer
Auditor General, Department of the Air Force

Unified Commands

Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command

Other Defense Organizations

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency
Director, Defense Logistics Agency
Director, National Security Agency
Inspector General, National Security Agency
Inspector General, Defense Intelligence Agency

Non-Defense Federal Organizations and Individuals

Office of Management and Budget
Technical Information Center, National Security and International Affairs Division,
General Accounting Office

Chairman and ranking minority member of each of the following congressional committees and subcommittees:

Senate Committee on Appropriations
Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
House Committee on Appropriations
House Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Appropriations
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
House Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology,
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
House Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal
Justice, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
House Committee on National Security

Part III - Management Comments

Department of the Army Comments



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION
103 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0103

July 9, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE (AUDITING), 400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE,
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202

SUBJECT: Audit Report on Unit Chemical and Biological Defense Readiness Training
(Project No. 6RA-5041.01)-ACTION MEMORANDUM

Reference the Audit Report on Unit Chemical and Biological Defense Readiness
Training (Project No. 6RA-5041.01).

The Army believes the Draft DoD IG Audit Report represents a fair and accurate
assessment of the DoD Chemical and Biological (CB) Defense Readiness Training. At
enclosure is the Army's response to the Audit Report.

PAUL J. HOEPER
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Research, Development and Acquisition)

Enclosure

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Draft DoD Audit Report
Unit Chemical and Biological Defense Training
Project No. 6RA-5041.01

Army concurs with the findings and recommendations provided in the draft report.

Recommendation 2a: Revise the format of periodic training briefings to include reports by unit commanders on the readiness of their units to conduct wartime missions under chemical and biological conditions.

Renumbered as
Recommendation
1.a.

Planned Action: Appropriate Mission Essential Task List (METL) will be assessed as trained, practiced, or untrained under chemical and biological conditions as part of the Quarterly Training Briefs (QTB) and Semi-Annual Training Briefs (SATB).

Recommendation 2b: Require that the results of internal and external evaluations be used by unit commanders in assessing unit readiness to conduct wartime missions under chemical and biological conditions.

Renumbered as
Recommendation
1.b.

Planned Action: Headquarters, Department of the Army will reemphasize to the field that unit commanders will base readiness assessments on the results of internal and external evaluations as well as major training events, equipment serviceability, personnel readiness, and individual training. This assessment will include operations in both a chemical/biological and a conventional environment.

Recommendation 2c: Require that support units receive external evaluations of chemical and biological defense readiness similar to the evaluation of combat units.

Renumbered as
Recommendation
1.c.

Planned Action: Support units are currently required by Mission Training Plans (MTPs) to conduct external evaluation which include chemical and biological defense tasks.

Recommendation 2d: Require that the results of external evaluations of unit chemical and biological defense readiness be elevated to a higher level within the Services.

Renumbered as
Recommendation
1.d.

Planned Action: Results of external evaluations of unit chemical and biological defense readiness will be reported two levels higher.

Department of the Navy Comments



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
(MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS)
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

9 1072

MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE (DIRECTOR, READINESS AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT
DIRECTORATE)

SUBJECT: DODIG draft Audit Report on: Unit Chemical and
Biological Defense Readiness Training (6RA-5041.01)

Your memorandum of April 6, 1998 requested Department of the
Navy management comments on DODIG draft audit report on Unit
Chemical and Biological Defense Readiness Training (Attachment
1).

The Department of the Navy concurs with the recommendations
of the subject report. Specific Navy and Marine Corps comments
are included (Attachments 2 and 3).

Karen S. Heath
Principal Deputy

Attachments:

1. DODIG (Logistics Support Directorate)
memo of 06APR98
2. CNO (N7) memo of 28MAY98
3. USMC (CMC) memo of 13MAY98

NAVY COMMENTS
ON
DODIG DRAFT AUDIT REPORT
ON
UNIT CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE
READINESS TRAINING
PROJECT #6RA-5041.01

The Navy has reviewed the draft report, and the following comments are provided:

Recommendation 1. "We recommend that Director, Joint Staff, modify the procedures for reporting overall training readiness in the Status of Resources and Training System to require mandatory comments on how chemical and biological defense training assessments were made."

Deleted

Navy Response: Concur. Assessment results are currently reported to the Type Commander via a monthly Training Report.

Recommendation 2. N/A

Renumbered as
Recommendation
1.

Recommendation 3. "We recommend that the Chief of Naval Operations require air squadrons to report periodically to the appropriate Naval Air Forces Commander on chemical and biological defense training conducted."

Renumbered as
Recommendation
2.

Navy Response: Concur. NAVAIR is addressing the issue of squadron training/reporting and standardizing aircraft decontamination standards.

Department of the Navy Comments

Final Report Reference

MARINE CORPS COMMENTS
ON
DODIG DRAFT AUDIT REPORT
ON
UNIT CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE
READINESS TRAINING
PROJECT #6RA-5041.01

The Marine Corps has reviewed the draft report, and the following comments are provided:

Deleted

Recommendation 1. "We recommend that the Director, Joint Staff, modify the procedures for reporting overall training readiness in the Status of Resources and Training System to require mandatory comments on how chemical and biological defense training readiness assessments were made."

Marine Corps response: Concur. Since 1993, Marine Corps Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) has required unit commanders to make an overall assessment on chemical and biological defense (CBD). This assessment is based on the reporting unit's mission and how it relates to personnel, training and equipment on hand. Commanders are required to submit additional remarks on how CBD has affected the unit's mission as well as why the unit is not C-1 in its CBD assessment. SORTS policy for reporting CBD training is valid within the Marine Corps.

Renumbered as
Recommendation
1.a.

Recommendation 2a. "We recommend that the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps revise the format of periodic training briefings to include reports by unit commanders on the readiness of their units to conduct wartime missions under chemical and biological conditions."

Marine Corps response: Concur. Unit commanders conduct periodic training briefings on the capabilities and readiness of their unit to conduct wartime missions under chemical and biological conditions. Prior to deployment, unit commanders are provided updated intelligence reports which include the chemical and biological threat in their area of operations.

Renumbered as
Recommendation
1.b.

Recommendation 2b. "We recommend that the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps require that the results of internal and external evaluations be used by unit commanders in assessing unit readiness to conduct wartime missions under chemical and biological conditions."

Marine Corps response: Concur. The results of Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES) evaluations and Marine Corps Inspector General Readiness Assessment Team visits are used by the unit commander in assessing unit readiness and capabilities under chemical and biological conditions.

Renumbered as
Recommendation
1.c.

Recommendation 2c. "We recommend that the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps require that support units receive

external evaluations of chemical and biological defense readiness similar to the evaluations of combat units."

Marine Corps response: Concur. MCCRES evaluations are conducted biannually for all Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) elements. These evaluations are based on mission oriented scenarios, including chemical and biological contingencies. Further, Marine Expeditionary Units must accomplish one of their evaluated missions under CBD conditions to certify as special operations capable.

Recommendation 2d. "We recommend that the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps require that the results of external evaluations of unit chemical and biological defense readiness be elevated to a higher level within the Services."

Renumbered as
Recommendation
1.d.

Marine Corps response: Concur. The results of MCCRES evaluations and Readiness Assessment Team visits are forwarded through the chain of command to Headquarters Marine Corps.

Recommendation 3. "We recommend that the Chief of Naval Operations require air squadrons to report periodically to the appropriate Naval Air Forces commander on chemical and biological defense training conducted."

Renumbered as
Recommendation
2.

Marine Corps response: Defer comment to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Department of the Air Force Comments

Final Report
Reference



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

19 JUN 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITING OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

FROM: HQ USAF/IL
1030 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1030

SUBJECT: Audit Report on Unit Chemical and Biological Defense Readiness Training
(Project No. 6RA-5041.01)

This is in reply to your memorandum requesting the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller) to provide Air Force comments on subject report. We reviewed the recommendations for corrective action in the subject report and provide the following inputs:

Deleted

Recommendation 1. Non-concur. Current Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) reporting is adequate and already includes the ability for unit commanders to report CB defense training status. Mandating this action does not add value to the process.
ECD: Completed, no further Air Force action required.

Renumbered as
Recommendation
1.a.

Recommendation 2a. Non-concur. The Air Force periodic training briefing is the SORTS report. SORTS reports the unit commander's assessment of his/her unit's ability to conduct its wartime mission, including operating in a CB environment. This report is also used to inform MAJCOMs of a given unit's readiness capabilities.
ECD: Completed, no further Air Force action required.

Renumbered as
Recommendation
1.b.

Recommendation 2b. Concur with finding, Air Force already implementing. Operational readiness inspection (ORI) results are currently the principle external evaluation tool for unit commanders to assess the readiness of their units. Though the results of these evaluations are reported to the corresponding MAJCOM commander, they are also provided to the unit commander in sufficient detail to facilitate unit-level, corrective action decisions. The ORI provides external validation that self assessment cannot. Unit commanders use SORTS as an internal evaluation, on a monthly basis, to correct deficiencies.
ECD: Completed, no further Air Force action required.

Renumbered as
Recommendation
1.c.

Recommendation 2c. Concur with finding, Air Force already implementing. All Air Force support units with mobility or in-place wartime taskings receive external evaluations of CB defense through ORIs. For example, test engineers at CONUS installations would not be expected to perform duty wearing chemical-biological individual protective equipment, though

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maintenance personnel at bases in Korea would. ORI reports address specific support areas and issues pertaining to each unit.

ECD: Completed, no further Air Force action required.

Recommendation 2d. Non-concur. The Air Force provides Air Staff-level oversight on external evaluations through the office of the Air Force Inspector General (SAF/IG). SAF/IG monitors the results of all Air Force ORIs. MAJCOM IGs use guidance provided by SAF/IG who is charged with ensuring consistency across the force. MAJCOM IGs work for and report to their MAJCOM commanders. MAJCOM commanders can allocate resources to their units, if needed, to correct deficiencies. Special issues requiring Air Force Chief of Staff attention are provided to SAF/IG, if necessary.

ECD: Completed, no further Air Force action required.

Recommendation 3. Not Applicable.

Our POCs are Mr. Tur-Rojas and Maj Horan, AF/LEOR, 601-0487.



ROBERT D. WOLFF, P.E.

Acting DCS/Installations & Logistics

Renumbered as
Recommendation
1.d.

Renumbered as
Recommendation
2.

cc:
SAF/IGI
SAF/MIQ
SAF/FMPF
SAF/AGA
AF/XOS
AF/XON
AF/XOJ

Joint Staff Comments

Final Report
Reference



THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC

Reply ZIP Code:
20318-0300

DJSM-642-98
11 June 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Subject: Audit Report on Unit Chemical and Biological Defense Readiness Training
(Project No. 6RA-5041.01)

1. The Joint Staff has reviewed the audit¹ and nonconcur in the finding on the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) and Recommendation #1. We concur with Service comments on the remainder of the report.

2. Finding on GSORTS

a. The finding on GSORTS states "SORTS did not highlight the CB defense readiness of reporting units. . . . The Joint Staff agreed, in a memorandum dated Oct 29, 1992, to revise SORTS to require mandatory reporting of CB defense equipment and training status. However, as of Jan 98, SORTS reporting had not been revised to include information on CB defense training status. Although unit commanders could include their assessments of CB defense training as written comments in the remarks section of SORTS, as of Jan 98, none of the units reviewed included any remarks related to CB training."

b. The Joint Staff nonconcur in this finding based on the following:

(1) The Joint Staff has revised reporting requirements. In August 1993, Joint Publication 1-03.3 was revised to include procedures for reporting chemical and biological defense readiness in the remarks section of GSORTS. Joint Publication 1-03.3 states: "The mission for which the unit was organized and designed includes the requirement to operate in a Chemical, Biological Defense (CBD) environment. The commander's subjective assessment is given on a scale of "1" to "4" of CBD equipment and training." This requirement was made mandatory in October 1997 through CJCSI 3401.02, "Global Status of Resources and Training."

(2) Joint Publication 1-03.3 prescribes the minimum requirements for CBD reporting. Additional Service-directed data also reside in GSORTS. An example is the Army's additional information on chemical and biological equipment on hand and its maintenance.

(3) A random sample of the 21 May 1998 GSORTS database showed inclusion of CBD information in units' reports for all four Services.

3. Recommendation #1

a. Recommendation #1 states, "We recommend that the Director, Joint Staff, modify the procedures for reporting overall training readiness in the Status of Resources and Training System to require mandatory comments on how chemical and biological defense training assessments were made."

Revised

Deleted


b. The Joint Staff nonconcur in the recommendation. GSORTS is a readiness reporting system, not a procedural manual nor a commentary on how training is accomplished. The Services direct requirements for readiness assessment procedures as part of their Title X authority to train, equip, and supply. If there is a problem identified in those procedures, then the appropriate directives should be changed to ensure that adequate assessments are accomplished. Requiring units to include in GSORTS the methodology by which they conduct an assessment would result in an accounting of thousands of individual methodologies with little utility for those who review and analyze the results.

c. As detailed in subparagraph 2b above, the existing GSORTS system already provides a mechanism for identifying CB training readiness issues. Revising the system to add additional reporting requirements is unnecessary and would place redundant requirements on unit commanders. As noted in the audit report, command emphasis is required to ensure realistic training is accomplished. The same emphasis on use of the in-place reporting system could correct the problem without revising the system.

4. Recommendations #2 and #3 pertain to Service training and evaluation procedures. The Joint Staff agrees with Service comments.

5. Page 6, 1st paragraph, line 6. Delete the word "extended." Rationale: Although we agree it is likely US forces will have to operate in a CB environment, it does not logically follow that units will be required to operate in extended CB conditions.

6. Page 12, "Emphasis and Reporting on CB Readiness" section, 1st paragraph, lines 3 and 4. Delete "and inadequate assessment and reporting of unit CB readiness." Rationale: This sentence asserts that "lack of command emphasis . . . and inadequate assessment and reporting of unit CB readiness" are direct causes of not accomplishing realistic training. We disagree. If there were inadequate assessment and reporting, they would also be the result of lack of command emphasis, not a cause of unrealistic training.


DENNIS C. BLAIR
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director, Joint Staff

Renumbered as
Recommendations
1. and 2.

Deleted

Reference:

¹ Office of the Inspector General memorandum, 6 April 1998, "Audit Report on Unit Chemical and Biological Defense Readiness Training (Project No. 6RA-5041.01)"

Audit Team Members

This report was prepared by the Readiness and Logistics Support Directorate, Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, DoD.

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